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Abstract
Identifying adversarial examples is beneficial for
understanding deep networks and developing ro-
bust models. However, existing attacking meth-
ods for image object detection have two limitations:
weak transferability—the generated adversarial ex-
amples often have a low success rate to attack other
kinds of detection methods, and high computation
cost—they need much time to deal with video data,
where many frames need polluting. To address
these issues, we present a generative method to ob-
tain adversarial images and videos, thereby signif-
icantly reducing the processing time. To enhance
transferability, we manipulate the feature maps ex-
tracted by a feature network, which usually con-
stitutes the basis of object detectors. Our method
is based on the Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) framework, where we combine a high-level
class loss and a low-level feature loss to jointly train
the adversarial example generator. Experimen-
tal results on PASCAL VOC and ImageNet VID
datasets show that our method efficiently generates
image and video adversarial examples, and more
importantly, these adversarial examples have better
transferability, therefore being able to simultane-
ously attack two kinds of representative object de-
tection models: proposal based models like Faster-
RCNN and regression based models like SSD.
1 Introduction
Deep learning techniques have achieved great success in vari-
ous computer vision tasks [Li et al., 2018a; Wei et al., 2018a].
However, it is also proved that neural networks are vulnera-
ble to adversarial examples [Szegedy et al., 2013], thereby
attracting a lot of attention on attacking (e.g., FGSM [Good-
fellow et al., 2014; Dong et al., 2018], deepfool [Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016], C&W attack [Carlini and Wagner,
2017]) and defending (e.g., [Raghunathan et al., 2018]) a net-
work. Attacking is beneficial for deeply understanding neu-
ral networks [Dong et al., 2017] and motivating more robust
solutions [Pang et al., 2018]. Though much work has been
done for image classification, more and more methods are
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Figure 1: An example of the comparisons between DAG (Dense Ad-
versary Generation) and our UEA (Unified and Efficient Adversary)
against proposal and regression based detectors. In the first row,
Faster-RCNN and SSD300 detect the correct objects. The second
row lists the adversarial examples from DAG. We see it succeeds to
attack Faster-RCNN, but fails to attack SSD300. In this third row,
neither Faster-RCNN nor SSD300 detects the cars on the adversarial
images. Moreover, the UEA’s processing time is almost 1000 times
faster than DAG for generating an adversarial image.
presented to attack other tasks [Akhtar and Mian, 2018], such
as face recognition [Sharif et al., 2016], video action recog-
nition [Wei et al., 2018b], and the physical-world adversarial
attack on road signs [Evtimov et al., 2017].
As the core task in computer vision, object detection for
image data has also been attacked. It is known that the current
object detection models can be roughly categorized into two
classes: proposal based models and regression based mod-
els. The various mechanisms make attacking object detection
more complex than image classification. [Xie et al., 2017]
proposes a white-box attacking method for proposal based
models: Dense Adversary Generation (DAG). They choose
Faster-RCNN [Ren et al., 2017] as the threat model. DAG
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Figure 2: The training framework of Unified and Efficient Adversary (UEA). Besides the GAN loss and similarity loss, we formulate DAG’s
high-level class loss and our low-level multi-scale attention feature loss into GAN framework to jointly train a generator. In the testing
phase, the generator is used to output adversarial images or video frames to fool the different classes of object detectors (blue dashed box).
firstly assigns an adversarial label for each proposal region
and then performs iterative gradient back-propagation to mis-
classify the proposals. The similar methods are also pre-
sented in [Chen et al., 2018b; Li et al., 2018b]. Because
regression-based methods don’t use region proposals, DAG
cannot directly transfer to attack them. That means DAG
has weak black-box attacking ability. In addition, DAG is
an optimization method, which often needs 150 to 200 iter-
ations to meet the end for an image [Xie et al., 2017]. The
high computation cost makes DAG not available for attack-
ing video object detection, which usually considers tempo-
ral interactions between adjacent frames [Zhu et al., 2017a;
Zhu et al., 2017b] and therefore the most reliable attacking
method for video object detection is to pollute all the frames
or many key frames in the video.
To address these issues, in this paper, we propose the Uni-
fied and Efficient Adversary (UEA) for image and video ob-
ject detection. “Efficient” specifies that our method is able to
quickly generate adversarial images, and thus can efficiently
deal with every frame in the video. To this end, we utilize a
generative mechanism instead of the optimization procedure.
Specifically, we formulate the problem into Generative Ad-
versarial Network (GAN) framework like [Xiao et al., 2018;
Poursaeed et al., 2018], and train a generator network to gen-
erate adversarial images and key frames. Because the test-
ing step only involves the forward network, the running time
is fast. As for “Unified”, it means that the proposed adver-
sary has better transferability than DAG, and thus has strong
black-box attacking ability. It can not only perform reliable
attack to Faster-RCNN like DAG, but also effectively attack
regression based detectors. We observe that both the pro-
posal and regression based detectors utilize feature networks
as their backends. For examples, Faster-RCNN and SSD [Liu
et al., 2016] use the same VGG16 [Simonyan and Zisserman,
2014]. If we manipulate the features maps in Faster-RCNN,
the generated adversarial examples will also make SSD fail
to detect objects. This idea is implemented as a multi-scale
attention feature loss in our paper, i.e., manipulating the fea-
ture maps from multiple layers. To fool detectors, only the
regions of foreground objects need perturbing. Therefore, an
attention weight is integrated into the feature loss to manip-
ulate the feature subregions. The usage of attention weight
also improves the imperceptibility of generated adversarial
examples because the number of perturbed pixels is limited.
In the viewpoint of DNNs’ depth, DAG’s class loss is applied
on the high-level softmax layer, and attention feature loss is
performed on the low-level backend layer. Besides class loss,
UEA incorporates an additional feature loss to get the strong
transferability, which is reasonable. Figure 1 gives an exam-
ple of UEA, and Figure 2 illustrates the overall framework.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
• We propose the Unified and Efficient Adversary (UEA)
for attacking image and video detection. To the best
of our knowledge, UEA is the first attacking method
that can not only efficiently deal with both images and
videos, but also simultaneously fool the proposal based
detectors and regression based detectors.
• We propose a multi-scale attention feature loss to en-
hance the UEA’s black-box attacking ability. Further-
more, we formulate the existing high-level class loss and
the proposed low-level feature loss within GAN frame-
work to jointly train a better generator.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the related work. We present the proposed
Unified and Efficient Adversary framework in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 reports all experimental results. Finally, we summarize
the conclusion in Section 5.
2 Related Work
The related work comes from two aspects: image and video
object detection and adversarial attack for object detection.
2.1 Image and Video Object Detection
Object detection is an area where deep learning has shown
its great power. Currently, the dominant image object de-
tection models can be roughly categorized into two classes:
proposal based models and regression based models. The for-
mer class typically contains R-CNN [Girshick et al., 2016],
Faster-RCNN [Ren et al., 2017], Mask-RCNN [He et al.,
2017], etc. These kinds of methods use a two-step procedure.
They firstly detect proposal regions, and then classify them
to output the final detected results. The latter class is repre-
sented by YOLO [Redmon et al., 2016] and SSD [Liu et al.,
2016]. They regard the detection task as the regression pro-
cess, and directly predict the coordinates of bounding boxes.
Compared with the image scenario, video object detection
incorporates temporal interactions between adjacent frames
into the procedure. They usually apply the existing image
detector on the selected key frames, and then propagate the
bounding boxes via temporal interactions [Zhu et al., 2017a;
Zhu et al., 2017b; Chen et al., 2018a]. Therefore, image ob-
ject detection forms the basis of the video object detection. In
this paper, we aim to present a unified method that can attack
both the image and video detectors.
2.2 Adversarial Attack for Object Detection
Currently, adversarial attacks for the object detection are
rare. The first method is proposed by [Xie et al., 2017],
named DAG. They firstly assign an adversarial label for each
proposal region and then perform iterative gradient back-
propagation to misclassify the proposals. DAG is based on
the optimization, and is time consuming, it needs many itera-
tions to accomplish an adversarial image. [Chen et al., 2018b;
Li et al., 2018b] present the similar idea. In addition, [Bose
and Aarabi, 2018] tries to attack the face detector. But
their threat model is also based on proposal based detectors
(Faster-RCNN). All these works attack the proposal based ob-
ject detectors, and they are all based on the the optimization
manner. A unified adversary, which can simultaneously at-
tack both the proposal based and regression based detectors,
is absent. In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap, and present
a unified method that can attack both the detectors.
Table 1: The difference between our method and the existing attack-
ing methods for object detection.
Methods Image Video Proposal Regression
[Bose and Aarabi, 2018] X X
[Chen et al., 2018b] X X
[Li et al., 2018b] X X
[Xie et al., 2017] X X
Our UEA X X X X
3 Methodology
In this section, we introduce the details of UEA.
3.1 Problem Definition
Given an image I , our goal is to generate its corresponding
adversarial image Iˆ . We hope that Iˆ can attack the object
detector Dt. For a ground-truth object (Bi, Ci) on I , where
Bi is the bounding box, and Ci is the label. Suppose the
object detector Dt succeeds to detect this object and outputs
(bi, ci), where the IOU between Bi and bi is more than 0.5,
and Ci = ci. We let (bˆi, cˆi) denote the detected result of
this object on the adversarial image Iˆ (Note that bˆi may be
empty, which represents Dt doesn’t detect this object). If the
IOU between bˆi and Bi is less than 0.5 or cˆi 6= Ci, we can
say the object detector Dt is successfully attacked or fooled.
In order to measure the performance of attacking methods,
we will compute the detection accuracy using mAP (mean
Average Precision) on the entire dataset, and check the mAP
drop after attacks. For videos, we regard the key frames in a
video as images, and perform the same operation. We expect
the adversarial video can also fool the state-of-the-art video
detection models. TheDt is based on proposals or regression.
3.2 Unified and Efficient Adversary
In this section, we introduce the technical details of UEA.
Overall, we utilize a generative mechanism to accomplish this
task. Specifically, we formulate our problem into the con-
ditional GAN framework. The objective of the conditional
GAN can be expressed as:
LcGAN (G,D) = EI [logD(I)]+EI [log(1−D(G(I)))], (1)
where G is the generator to compute adversarial examples,
and D is the discriminator to distinguish the adversarial ex-
amples from the clean images. Because adversarial exam-
ples are defined as close as as possible with original exam-
ples [Szegedy et al., 2013], we input the original images (or
frames) and adversarial images (or frames) to the discrimina-
tor to compute GAN loss in Eq.(1). In addition, an L2 loss
between the clean images (or frames) and adversarial images
(or frames) is applied to measure their similarity:
LL2(G) = EI [||I − G(I)||2]. (2)
After training the generator based on GAN framework, we
use this generator to generate adversarial examples for testing
images and videos. The adversarial examples are then fed
into object detectors to accomplish the attacking task.
3.3 Network Architecture
Essentially, the adversarial example generation can be formu-
lated into an image-to-image translation problem. The clean
images or frames are input, and the adversarial images or
frames are output. Therefore, we can refer to the training
manner of pix2pix [Isola et al., 2017]. In this paper, we uti-
lize the network architecture in [Xiao et al., 2018] for Ima-
geNet images, that is the first framework to generate adver-
sarial examples using a pix2pix adversarial generative net-
work. The generator is an encoder-decoder network with 19
components. The discriminator is similar to ResNet-32 for
CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Please refer to [Xiao et al., 2018] for
the detailed structure of the generator and discriminator.
3.4 Loss Functions
To simultaneously attack the current two kinds of object de-
tectors, we need additional loss functions on the basis of
Eq.(1) and Eq.(2). To fool Faster-RCNN detector, DAG [Xie
et al., 2017] uses a misclassify loss to make the predictions
of all proposal regions go wrong. We also integrate this loss.
The class loss function is defined as follows:
LDAG(G) = EI [
N∑
n=1
[fln(X, tn)− flˆn(X, tn)]], (3)
where X is the extracted feature map from the feature network
of Faster-RCNN on I , and τ = {t1, t2, ..., tN} is the set of all
proposal regions on X. tn is the n-th proposal region from the
Region Proposal Network (RPN). ln is the ground-truth label
of tn, and lˆn is the wrong label randomly sampled from other
incorrect classes. fln(X, tn) ∈ RC denotes the classification
score vector (before softmax normalization) on the n-th pro-
posal region. In the experiments, we pick the proposals with
score ≥0.7 to form τ = {t1, t2, ..., tN}.
DAG loss function is specially designed for attacking
Faster-RCNN, therefore its transferability to other kinds of
models is weak. To address this issue, we propose the fol-
lowing multi-scale attention feature loss:
LFea(G) = EI [
M∑
m=1
||Am ◦ (Xm − Rm)||2], (4)
where Xm is the extracted feature map in the m-th layer of
the feature network. Rm is a randomly predefined feature
map, and is fixed during training. To fool detectors, only the
regions of foreground objects need perturbing. We use the
attention weight Am to measure the objects in Xm. Am is
computed based on the region proposals of RPN. We let sn
denote the score of region proposal tn. For each pixel in the
original image, we collect all the region proposals covering
this pixel, and compute the sum S of these proposals’ scores
sn, and then divide S by the number of proposals N to obtain
the attention weight in the original image. Finally, Am is ob-
tained by mapping the original attention weight to the m-th
feature layer. For the pixels within objects, their weights will
have large values and vice verse. ◦ is the Hadamard product
between two matrices. By making Xm as close as Rm, Eq.(4)
enforces the attention feature maps to be random permuta-
tion, and thus manipulates the feature patterns of foreground
objects. Rm can also be replaced by other feature maps dif-
ferent from Xm. In the experiments, we choose the Relu layer
after conv3-3 and the Relu layer after conv4-2 in VGG16 to
manipulate their feature maps. To compute Am, we use the
top 300 region proposals according to their scores.
Finally, our full objective can be expressed as:
L = LcGAN + αLL2 + βLDAG + LFea, (5)
where α, β,  are the relative importance of each objective.
We set α = 0.05, β = 1. For , we set 1×10−4 and 2×10−4
for the selected two layers, respectively. G andD are obtained
by solving the minmax game argminGmaxDL. To optimize
our networks under Eq.(5), we follow the standard approach
from [Isola et al., 2017] and apply the Adam solver [Kingma
and Ba, 2014]. The best weights are obtained after 6 epochs.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
Image Detection In order to train the adversarial generator in
UEA, we use the training dataset of PASCAL VOC 2007 with
totally 5011 images. They are categorized into 20 classes.
In testing phase, we use the PASCAL VOC 2007 testing set
[Everingham et al., ] with 4952 images.
Video Detection For video detection, we use ImageNet
VID dataset1. There are 759 video snippets for training set,
1http://bvisionweb1.cs.unc.edu/ILSVRC2017/download-videos-
1p39.php
and 138 for testing set. The frame rate is 25 or 30 fps for most
snippets. There are 30 object categories, which are a subset
of the categories in the ImageNet dataset.
4.2 Metrics
We use two metrics: attacking performance against object de-
tectors; the generating time for adversarial examples.
Fooling Rate: to test the fooling rate of different attacking
methods, we use the mAP drop (mean Average Precision).
The mAP is usually to evaluate the recognition accuracy of
object detectors both for image and video data. If the adver-
sary is strong, detectors will achieve a lower mAP on adver-
sarial examples than clean examples. The reducing error can
be used to measure the attacking methods.
Time: to tackle with video data, the time for generating ad-
versarial examples is important. In the experiments, we report
the processing time for each image (frame) against different
attacking methods.
4.3 Threat Models
Image Detection In this setting, our goal is to simultaneously
attack the proposal based detectors and regression based de-
tectors. We select two representative methods: Faster-RCNN
and SSD300. There are a lot of implementation codes for
them. Here we use the Simple Faster-RCNN2 and torchCV
SSD3003. We retrain their models on PASCAL VOC training
datasets. Specifically, Faster-RCNN is trained on the PAS-
CAL VOC 2007 training dataset, and tested on the PASCAL
VOC 2007 testing set. The detection accuracy (mAP) reaches
0.70. SSD300 is trained on the hybrid dataset consisting of
PASCAL VOC 2007 and 2012 training set, and tested on the
PASCAL VOC 2007 testing set. The mAP reaches 0.68.
Video Detection The current video detection methods
are based on image detection. They usually perform im-
age detection on key frames, and then propagate the re-
sults to other frames [Zhu et al., 2017a; Zhu et al., 2017b;
Chen et al., 2018a]. However, as shown in [Zhu et al.,
2017b], the detection accuracy of these efficient methods can-
not even outperform the simple dense detection method, that
densely runs the image detection on each frame in a video.
In [Zhu et al., 2017a], although their method beats dense de-
tection method, they cost more time. If they reduce the pro-
cessing time, the accuracy also falls below the dense detec-
tion. Therefore, we choose the dense detection method as
the threat model. We argue if the dense detection method is
successfully attacked, the efficient methods will also fail.
4.4 Results on Image Detection
Comparisons with State-of-the-art Methods
The current state-of-the-art attacking method for image de-
tection is DAG. Therefore, we use DAG as our compared
method. For that, we generate adversarial image using DAG
and UEA, respectively, and then perform the same Faster-
RCNN and SSD300 on the adversarial examples to observe
the accuracy drop (compared with the accuracy on clean im-
ages). Meanwhile, we also check the generating time (Time).
The comparison results are reported in Table 2.
2https://github.com/chenyuntc/simple-faster-rcnn-pytorch
3https://github.com/kuangliu/torchcv
Table 2: The comparison results between DAG and UEA.
Methods Accuracy (mAP) Time (s)Faster-RCNN SSD300
Clean Images 0.70 0.68 \
DAG 0.05 0.64 9.3
UEA 0.05 0.20 0.01
Figure 3: The perceptibility comparison of adversarial images. The
first row is clean images. The second row is output by DAG (the
iteration is 1, 81, 133, 41, respectively). The third row is our output.
From the table, we see: (1): Both DAG and UEA work
well on attacking Faster-RCNN detector. They achieve the
same 0.65 accuracy drop (0.70-0.05). This is expected be-
cause DAG and UEA formulate the same class loss of Eq.(3)
into their methods, and they perform the white-box attack
against Faster-RCNN. (2): DAG cannot attack SSD detector,
the accuracy drop is only 0.04 (0.68-0.64). By contrast, UEA
obtains a 0.48 accuracy drop (0.68-0.20), which is 12 times
larger than DAG. This verifies the weak black-box attacking
ability of DAG. Instead, UEA integrates a feature loss to ma-
nipulate the shared feature networks between Faster-RCNN
and SSD. The feature loss enhances the transferability and
black-box attacking ability to other kinds of detectors. The-
oretically, UEA is able to attack a large class of object de-
tectors besides SSD and Faster-RCNN, because the majority
of object detectors use the feature network. (3): As for the
generating time of adversarial examples, UEA is almost 1000
times faster than DAG (0.01 vs 9.3). The efficiency is helpful
to tackle with video data. Even for the video with 100 frames,
UEA will only cost one second to pollute all the frames.
We also evaluate the perceptibility of adversarial examples.
Figure 3 gives the comparisons. As an optimization method,
DAG is highly relevant with different images. Their pertur-
bations are increasing with the rising iterations. For example,
DAG only costs 1 iteration for “cat” image, and the pertur-
bations are imperceptible. But for “motorbike” image, DAG
costs 81 iterations, and the perturbations are very obvious.
The “cow” and “boat” images have the similar trend. UEA is
a generative method. We see the adversarial examples are al-
ways imperceptible, and almost the same as the clean images.
Ablation Study of UEA
Now we look into the ablation study of UEA. As introduced
in Section 3, UEA utilizes two key loss functions in the train-
ing phase. The first is class loss, i.e., Eq.(3), and the second
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Figure 4: The ablation study of UEA for each category detection.
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Figure 5: The qualitative comparisons between DAG and UEA ver-
sus Faster-RCNN and SSD300. Please see the texts for details.
is multi-scale attention feature loss, i.e., Eq.(4). We study
the function of each loss, and report the results for each cate-
gory detection in Figure 4. In this figure, “class loss” denotes
the absence of “feature loss” in UEA, i.e., only the DAG’s
loss. “hybrid loss” is the full version of UEA with both “class
loss” and “feature loss”. From the figure, we see that “class
loss” works well on Faster-RCNN, but shows the limited at-
tacking ability on SSD300. After adding the proposed “fea-
ture loss”, UEA has the similar attacking performance with
“class loss” on Faster-RCNN, but shows stronger attacking
ability on SSD300. These results demonstrate that hybrid the
high-level class loss and low-level feature loss is a reasonable
choice for attacking object detectors.
Qualitative Comparisons
We give some qualitative comparisons between DAG and
UEA in Figure 5. From the figure, we see both Faster-RCNN
and SSD300 work well on the clean images, and detect the
correct bounding boxes and labels. For DAG, it succeeds to
attack Faster-RCNN (see the sixth row where Faster-RCNN
doesn’t detect any object on two images and predicts wrong
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Figure 6: The feature visualization of adversarial examples via DAG
and UEA, respectively. Please see the texts for details.
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Figure 7: The qualitative result of attacking video object detection
labels on three images). However, SSD300 still works well
on the adversarial examples generated by DAG. For UEA,
Faster-RCNN cannot detect any bounding box on five adver-
sarial examples, and SSD300 detects wrong objects on two
images and zero detection on three images.
To better show the intrinsic mechanism of UEA, we visu-
alize the feature maps extracted from adversarial examples
via DAG and UEA, respectively. Because Faster-RCNN and
SSD300 utilize the same VGG16 as their feature network, we
select the feature maps extracted on conv4 layer and visual-
ize them using the method in [Zeiler and Fergus, 2014]. From
Figure 6, we see that the feature maps via UEA have been ma-
nipulated. Therefore, the Region Proposal Network within
Faster-RCNN cannot output the available proposal regions,
and thus Faster-RCNN doesn’t detect any bounding box. For
SSD300, the manipulated features make the regression oper-
ation not work, leading to wrong or vacant predictions.
4.5 Results on Video Detection
In this section, we report the results on video object detec-
tion. We here use the ImageNet VID dataset. As discussed
in section 4.3, we attack the dense frame detection meth-
ods. Specifically, we train Faster-RCNN and SSD300 on Im-
ageNet VID dataset, and then run the detectors on each frame
in the testing video. We believe that if the dense frame de-
tection method can be successfully attacked, other efficient
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Figure 8: The detecting performance of object detectors on clean
videos and adversarial videos for each category detection.
methods will be also fooled. Figure 7 reports the qualitative
attacking results versus “airplane”. Similarly, UEA simulta-
neously fools Faster-RCNN and SSD300. In Figure 8, we list
the comparison mAP performance for each category detec-
tion. Readers can have a clear observation for the mAP drop
for each class on ImageNet VID.
Table 3 shows the quantitative attacking performance of
UEA on ImageNet VID. Specifically, we train Faster-RCNN
and SSD300 on the training set of ImageNet VID, and run
the trained detectors on the testing set. In addition, we use
UEA to generate the corresponding adversarial videos for the
testing set of ImageNet VID, and then run the same detectors.
In Table 3, we see UEA achieves 0.40 mAP drop for Faster-
RCNN, and 0.44 mAP drop for SSD300, which shows UEA
achieves a good attacking performance in the video data.
We here use the VGG16 based Faster-RCNN and SSD300.
[Zhu et al., 2017b] shows that if we use ResNet 101 as the
backbone network, and replace Faster-RCNN with FCN [Dai
et al., 2016] as the object detector, the original mAP will
reach 0.73. Because our paper aims at measuring the attack-
ing ability of UEA, rather than the detecting performance,
the mAP drop is the key metric, rather than mAP. There-
fore, we here don’t use ResNet 101+FCN. Similarly, we also
don’t use the SSD500, although it has better detection than
SSD300. The current mAP drop has verified the powerful at-
tacking ability of UEA both against the proposal based detec-
tor (Faster-RCNN) and regression based detector (SSD300).
We believe that if we use the advanced object detectors, the
mAP drop will also improve.
Table 3: The attacking performance of UEA on video detection.
Methods Accuracy (mAP) Time (s)Faster-RCNN SSD300
Clean Videos 0.43 0.50 \
UEA 0.03 0.06 0.3s
mAP drop 0.40 0.44 \
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the Unified and Efficient Adver-
sary (UEA). UEA was able to efficiently generate adversar-
ial examples, and its processing time was 1000 times faster
than the current attacking methods. Therefore, UEA could
deal with not only image data, but also video data. More
importantly, UEA had better transferability than the existing
attacking methods, and thus, it could meanwhile attack the
current two kinds of representative object detectors. Experi-
ments conducted on PASCAL VOC and ImageNet VID veri-
fied the effectiveness and efficiency of UEA.
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